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NOTES
The Limited Fiduciary Duties
Owed by Corporate Managers
to Preferred Shareholders:
A Need for Change
BY NOELLE M. HOLLADAY*
INTRODUCTION
t is well established that corporate managers owe fiduciary duties
to shareholders.' Therefore, because preferred shareholders are
shareholders of the corporation,2 the officers and directors of a
corporation have a duty to maxinmze wealth for both common shareholders
and preferred shareholders.3 Managers can enhance the value of sharehold-
ers' stock by either increasing corporate value or reallocating wealth
among the corporation's constituencies.4 To the extent that managers
* J.D. expected 2000, University of Kentucky The topic of tius Note was
suggested by Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Willburt D. Ham Professor of Law,
Umversity of Kentucky College of Law.
'See, e.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the
Post-Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv 561, 577 (1996) [heremafter
Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles]; Susan A. Barrett, Fiduciary Duties
and Stock Warrants: A Fine Distinction Between ShareholderRights and Contract
Rights, 21 STETSON L. REV 253,259-60 (1991).
2See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The PuzzlingParadox ofPreferred Stock (and Why
We Should Care About 1t), 51 Bus. LAW 443, 445 (1996).
3 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 KY. L.J. 455, 469 (1996) [hereinafter Campbell,
A Positive Analysis].
4 See id. at 460.
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maximize wealth by transferring value from preferred shareholders to
common shareholders, a "horizontal conflict"5 exists among these two
groups. 6 However, by contractually agreeing to the terms of preferred
stock, preferred shareholders may be viewed as having opted out of their
rights to fiduciary duties associated with these terms.' Various methods to
deal with the conflict between preferred shareholders and common
shareholders (and the significance of the "opt-out issue") are proposed by
commentators. This Note examines the rule adopted by courts and the
various methods proposed to fairly address the rights of all parties and
provide preferred shareholders with meaningful protection in situations of
horizontal conflict.
Part I describes the vulnerable nature of preferred stock and the
fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers to preferred shareholders.'
Part II discusses the horizontal conflict that exists between preferred
shareholders and common shareholders where the managers' method of
maximizing shareholder wealth is to transfer wealth from one group to
another (and which is worsened by the differing goals of the preferred
shareholders and the common shareholders).9 Part III explains the opt-out
issue through the examples of redemption of preferred stock and old
dividend credit cases, and discusses various opinions on the significance
which should be placed on the opt-out issue.1
Part IV of this Note describes the method used by courts in dealing
with the horizontal conflict between the preferred shareholders and the
common shareholders and the related opt-out issue." Despite the fact that
preferred shareholders occupy a vulnerable position in relation to the
corporation, the rule used by courts affords them little protection. The
I A "horizontal conflict" exists in a corporation when one corporate consti-
tuency's gains result in another corporate constituency's losses. See infra notes 29-
32 and accompanying text.
6 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 446. Mitchell notes that a conflict exists where
advantages to one corporate constituency come at the expense of another
constituency. See id.
' See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 494-95 (illustrating the
opt-out issue through the example of a redemption of preferred stock); infra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 14-28 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
'oSee infra notes 37-62 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 63-123 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 88
LIMITED FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Jedwab rule 2 provides that preferred shareholders are entitled to fiduciary
protection for only those rights that are common to all shareholders. All
other rights are deemed "preferred" and are governed by the corporate
contract from which they originated. In addition, courts will judge whether
a breach has occurred in cases ofpreferredrights by strictly construing the
contract in favor of the corporate drafter, not the preferred shareholders.
Part V examines the various methods proposed by commentators to
• deal with the conflict between the preferred shareholders and the common
shareholders, as well as the significance of the opt-out issue in cases of
such conflict. 3 Most of the proposed methods agree that preferred
shareholders should be provided with more meaningful protection than
what is currently afforded by the Jedwab rule. The new rule recommended
by this Note builds on these proposed methods and provides preferred
shareholders with meaningful protection in situations ofhorizontal conflict
while also fairly addressing the rights of the common shareholders and the
corporation.
I. THE NATURE OF PREFERRED STOCK AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Preferred shareholders, like common shareholders, have an ownership
interest in the corporation and are therefore recognized as a corporate
constituency. 4 However, preferred shareholders are distinct from common
shareholders in that they have additional contractual rights which attach by
way of the corporate charter." These contractual rights, often called
"preferred rights" or "preferences," include: (1) the priority over common
shareholders in the right to receive dividends and (2) the priority in the
right to receive distributions in the event of the liquidation of the corpora-
tion.'6 Despite these preferences, preferred shareholders are a vulnerable
corporate constituency because they cannot vote 7 and because directors
favor common shareholders, the group responsible for their election to the
board.18 Commenting on the vulnerable position of preferred shareholders
'
2 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
'
3 See infra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.
'4 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 445.
'" See id. at 446; Barrett, supra note 1, at 260.
'6 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 446.
17 This Note assumes the existence of nonparticipating preferred stock.
'8 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Voluntary Recapitalizations, Fairness, and
Rule 10b-5: Life Along the Trail of Santa Fe, 66 KY. L.J. 267, 270 (1977)
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in the corporation, Professor Lawrence Mitchell states, "[A]ll is not well
jurisprudentially with preferred stock.... [T]he position of the preferred
shareholder in the corporate firmament, fiduciary rhetoric notwithstanding,
is more vulnerable than any other financial participant."' 9
Corporate managers20 owe fiduciary duties to shareholders to the
exclusion of other corporate constituencies.2' Since preferred shareholders
are shareholders of a corporation,2 managers owe fiduciary duties to both
common shareholders and preferred shareholders.' A manager's fiduciary
duty to shareholders is measured by the duties of loyalty and care24 and
includes an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.25 Shareholder
wealth can be maximized in one of two ways. First, managers can increase
the overall value of the corporation and allocate this wealth among
shareholders accordingly. Second, wealth can be expropriated from one
group and reallocated among other groups in the corporation.26
To the extent that managers attempt to maximize shareholder wealth
by transferring wealth from preferred shareholders to common shareholders
and vice versa, a horizontal conflict exists between these two groups.27
However, as will be discussed below, preferred shareholders may consent
to wealth transfers to the degree that such terms are agreed upon contractu-
ally at the time of investment. Therefore, preferred shareholders may be
viewed as having opted out of any fiduciary rights associated with an
expropriation of wealth from one group for the sole purpose of tmnsferring
wealth to another corporate constituency. 28
[hereinafter Campbell, Voluntary Recapitalizations].
'
9 Mitchell, supra note 2, at 443-44.
20 The term "corporate managers" will be used in this Note to refer to both
officers and directors of a corporation.
21 See Barrett, supra note 1, at 259-60.
22 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 445.
23 See Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 1, at 577.
24 See Barry J. Benzing, Getting What You Bargained For: The Contractual
Nature of a Preferred Shareholder's Rights-Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v.
Marriott Corp., 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 520 (1994); Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d
244,256 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1985).
' See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 469 (explaining that the
maximization of shareholder wealth can be accomplished if managers engage in all
transactions which move shareholders to "Pareto superior states," in which no
shareholder is made worse off and at least one shareholder is made better off).26 See id.
27 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 446.
28See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 494-95.
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PREFERRED
SHAREHOLDERS AND COMMON SHAREHOLDERS
As discussed previously, a horizontal conflict exists between common
shareholders and preferred shareholders because managers can maximize
shareholder wealth by reallocating wealth at the expense of one group,
often the preferred shareholders. 29 In addition, because shareholder returns
are a fixed sum game (inasmuch as one gains while the other loses),
transfers to preferred shareholders come at the expense of the common
shareholders, which results in an inherent conflict among the two groups..30
The conflict between preferred shareholders and common shareholders is
also apparent in the differing goals of the two constituencies. While
common shareholders benefit mainly from an appreciation in stock price,
preferred shareholders realize their gain from fixed dividends and "receive
little benefit from improved corporate performance."' This horizontal
conflict between corporate constituencies is not unique to common
shareholders and preferred shareholders; it is also a problem between
majority shareholders and minority shareholders.32 The conflict involving
preferred shareholders and common shareholders can be illustrated by the
example of a corporate recapitalization.
In a recapitalization, preferred rights are often changed in a way that
benefits common shareholders to the detriment of preferred shareholders,
thus resulting in a horizontal conflict. A recapitalization plan must be
proposed by a board of directors,33 which is usually elected by common
shareholders. Professor Campbell describes the conflict resulting from this
situation as follows: "[W]hen managers facilitate such recapitalizations,
their interests are aligned with common stockholders, and thus they are in
a conflict of interest with respect to the preferred stockholders in the
transaction. Not surprisingly, therefore, preferred stockholders subjected
to recapitalizations often complain that they are treated unfairly....,34
Although courts in past cases were "ineffective" in dealing with this
29 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 446.
30 See id.
311d. at 451.
32 See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 478 (discussing the con-
flict between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders in the context
of an affiliated merger).
33 See id. at 475.
34 Id. at 477.
1999-2000)
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conflict,35 modem cases hold that managers' actions in recapitalizations
must not amount to constructive fraud.36
ImI. THE PREFERRED SHAREHOLDER CONTRACT
AND THE OPT-OUT ISSUE
Managers owe fiduciary duties to preferred shareholders v.3 However,
these duties may be waived in part to the extent that preferred shareholders
opt out of their rights by agreeing to the terms of their preferences as stated
in the corporate charter.31 The "opt-out issue" is explained below through
the examples of a redemption by a corporation of preferred stock and the
old dividend credit cases.
Redeemable preferred stock may be called at the option of the
corporation to prevent preferred shareholders from realizing gains of an
appreciated stock price, a benefit normally associated with falling interest
rates.39 However, preferred shareholders do not claim, and a court would
not hold, that a fiduciary duty has been breached in this situation because
preferred shareholders are viewed as having contracted for this risk.40 In
other words, preferred shareholders agree to take on the risk of redemption
in exchange for favorable price terms and other preferences. 41 Therefore,
courts will uphold corporate redemption of preferred shares since preferred
shareholders opted out of their right to challenge such transactions on
fiduciary duty grounds.
The opt-out issue is also apparent in the holdings of the old dividend
credit cases.42 In these cases, preferred shareholders argued that directors
had breached their fiduciary duties in failing to pay preferred shareholders
their non-cumulative dividends.43 However, courts refused to find a breach
" See Campbell, Voluntary Recapitalizations, supra note 18, at 300.36 See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 477.
37 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.3 8See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 494-95.
39 See id. at 494.
40 See id. at 495.
41 See id. (noting that preferred shareholders are "paid to take the risk of re-
demption").
42 See id. (citing Sanders v. Cuba R.R., 120-A.2d 849,853 (N.J. 1956); Agnew
v. American Ice Co., 61 A.2d 154, 157 (N.J. Ch. 1948); Moran v. United States
Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry, 123 A. 546, 547 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd by an equally divided
court, 126 A. 329 (N.J. 1924)).
43 See id.
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of fiduciary duty in these cases because this refusal to pay past dividends
was permitted by the corporate charter and was thus bargained for in
advance by the parties." The rule developed from these cases was that once
the preferred shareholder plaintiffs met their burden of showing that
managers' actions had causedthe value of their stockto decline, the burden
was on management to demonstrate that the shareholders had consented to
this action. 5 In other words, preferred shareholders could generally only
prevail in dividend credit cases if there was no showing that the sharehold-
ers had contractually opted out of their fiduciary rights to claim dividends.
Nonetheless, the rule "provides an incentive to better bargaining 46 in that
it "will encourage the corporation to draft clear language regarding the
rights of preferred stockholders to dividends and to call these terms to the
attention of preferred stockholders. ' 47
There are differing views as to the significance of the opt-out issue in
transactions in which managers' actions negatively affect the rights of
preferred shareholders. "Contractarians" advocate that shareholders and
managers should be able to determine all of their respective rights and
duties contractually, not by imposing mandatory fiduciary duties on their
relationship. 8 Contractarians support their case by citing the economic
benefits of freedom of contract and personal autonomy.49
Those who support the imposition of mandatory fiduciary duties are
concerned about transactions resulting from the horizontal conflict between
preferred shareholders and common shareholders in which wealth is expro-
priated from the preferreds to benefit the commons. For example, Professor
Campbell opposes the Contractarians' position and argues that contractual
rights do not adequately address all of the problems caused to preferred
shareholders because of this inherent conflict.5" Instead, Campbell argues
that fiduciary duties should be imposed for two reasons. First, mandatory
fiduciary duties are necessary to protect preferred shareholders in instances
where these investors are harmed by risks that were not bargained for
contractually. For example, preferred shareholders need fiduciary pro-
44 See id. at 497.
45 See Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 1, at 619.
46 Id. at 620.
47Id.
41 See id. at 562.
41 See id. at 565-67.
So See id. at 623. Professor Campbell argues against a Contractarian world
where "greed" is a virtue and in favor of fiduciary principles that recognize the
societal values of "grace and kindness." Id.
1999-2000]
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tection in situations where common shareholders receive unfair compensa-
tion in a corporate recapitalization. Second, mandatory fiduciary duties are
supported by the societal value placed on Pareto5' superior moves by
corporations in which no shareholder is made worse off and at least one
shareholder is made better off.
52
The courts generally seem to agree with Professor Campbell. The
ground-breaking case of Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.53 established
the following general rule:
[Wjith respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that
distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and
its directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is
appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing the
contract; where however the right asserted is not to a preference as against
the common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the
existence of such right and the scope of the correlative duty may be
measured by equitable as well as legal standards.54
Therefore, under the Jedwab rule, a preferred stockholder's preferred rights
are protected only contractually while the rights that a preferred stock-
holder shares with common stockholders are governed by fiduciary duties.
The opt-out issue is thus important under the Jedwab rule only in situations
where a preferred shareholder claims injury in relation to a preferred right.
Professor Mitchell finds fault with this rule. 5 Mitchell states that
analysis under the Jedwab rule first requires one to determine whether a
right is preferred, and thus contractual, or inherent in common stock
ownership, and thus fiduciary. 6 This, he states, creates a "paradox" in
which directors are required to interpret the terms of the contract in order
to determine the scope of their own fiduciary duties to preferred sharehold-
ers.57 Thus, instead of mandating a duty of care owed by corporate
5 See supra note 25.
52 See Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 1, at 569-72;
Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 3, at 469.
53 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
541d. at 594.
5 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 443-44 (stating that "all is not well jurispru-
dentially with preferred stock" and "the position of the preferred stockholder...
is more vulnerable than any other financial participant").
56Seeid. at 448.57See id.
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managers to preferred shareholders, courts have allowed managers to
define the duty themselves. Therefore, Mitchell, like Campbell, argues that
"the answer should be to give preferred stockholders some meaningful
fiduciary rights." 8
Furthermore, since the equity in preferred stock exists prior to the
preferences, "fiduciary duty trumps contract,"59 and the real question in
these cases should be whether the transaction is fair, not whether the right
is based in contract or on basic stock ownership. Therefore, according to
Mitchell, fiduciary rights are superior to contractual rights and the opt-out
issue should be left to the courts, not the directors." In other words,
directors should not be permitted to strictly construe the preferred rights in
the contract, as would a party in an arms-length transaction with preferred
shareholders. Instead, Mitchell argues, directors, as fiduciaries to the
preferred shareholders, should be required to interpret the contract in the
light most favorable to preferred shareholders. However, because the
Jedwab rule permits directors to interpret contractual terms with preferred
shareholders strictly (as if parties were engaged in an arms-length
transaction instead of in a fiduciary relationship), Mitchell suggests that for
the moment preferred shareholders should plan to rely sblely on contractual
rights.6' Mitchell proposes that preferred shareholders bargain for contracts
which incorporate the concept of a fiduciary duty owed by managers,
instead of opting out of such rights.62
IV. How COURTS DEAL WITH HORIZONTAL CONFLICT
AND THE OPT-OUT ISSUE
Before analyzingthe case law discussing the conflictbetween preferred
and common shareholders, and the effect of the opt-out issue on this
58Id. at 449.
591 Id. at 459.
60 See Goldman v. Postal Tel., 52 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D. Del. 1943); Wood v.
Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del. 1979); Benzing, supra note 24, at
522. It should be noted that courts strictly construe preference rights in corporate
charters, since at common law all shares are equal and preferences are the
exception to the rule.
61 See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 444.
62 See id. at 476. Professor Mitchell notes that issuers would be unlikely to
accept a contract incorporating fiduciary concepts. However, the solution to this
problem may be for underwriters to "induce issuers to include the provision as a
signal of good faith to prospective preferred stockholders." Id. at 477.
1999-2000]
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conflict, it is necessary to point out that the law of the state of incorporation
is controlling with respect to the fiduciary duties owed by corporate
managers to shareholders.6" Given that the general rule in Jedwab was set
out by a Delaware court of chancery,' many of the cases discussed will
involve Delaware law.
In Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc.,6 the preferred shareholders
sought to enjoin aproposed merger of the corporation because the proceeds
of the merger were to be allocated unfairly among the commons and the
preferreds, to the detriment of the preferred shareholders.66 Although the
court ruled against the preferred shareholders, an important rule of law was
established: if preferential rights are implicated, the duty to preferred
shareholders is contractual; if, however, the rights asserted are ones shared
with the common stockholders, the duty owed to preferred shareholders is
fiduciary.6 7 As the following cases illustrate, Jedwab is often cited for the
rule that preferred shareholders are only owed fiduciary duties insofar as
common shareholders are owed fiduciary duties.
To the extent that preferred shareholders are injured by the exercise of
a preferred right, the contract will govern. In BB Korenvaes Investments v.
Marriott Corp., a group of preferred shareholders challenged the proposed
spin-off of a corporate subsidiary in which the common shareholders were
to be paid prior to the preferred shareholders by way of a "special
dividend."6 9 The preferred shareholders claimed that the directors of the
corporation had breached their fiduciary and contractual duties to the
preferred shareholders, who were entitled to dividends in preference over
the common shareholders." With respect to the fiduciary duties, the court
found that the contract governed the transaction because a priority right to
receive dividends is a preference right, not one shared with common
shareholders.7 Therefore, no fiduciary duties were implicated under the
facts of the case, as the "contractual protections and limitations provided
63 See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir.
1984).
6 Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. Ch. 1986).
6s id.
66 See id. at 587.
67 See id. at 594; supra note 54 and accompanying text.
68HB Korenvaes Invs. v. Marriott Corp., No. CIV.A. 12922, 1993 WL 257422
(Del. Ch. July 1, 1993).69 See Benzing, supra note 24, at 517, 523-24.
70 See id. at 517, 525.
71 See id. at 525-26.
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for in the certificate of designation deprived the preferred shareholder of
the fiduciary protection commonly afforded to a common shareholder."'T2
In addition, the court strictly construed the terms of the contract to
determine that the facts did not support the claim for breach of contract.
73
Korenvaes is a perfect example of the dilemma facing preferred sharehold-
ers: to the extent that their rights can be labeled "preferred;' they are
subject to the strict construction of a contract most likely drafted by an
issuer interested only in favorable terms for the corporation.
Redemption of preferred stock, like the priority in the right to receive
dividends, is considered apreferredright. Therefore, redemption rights will
be governed by a court's strict construction of a contract, not by the more
shareholder-friendly fiduciary duties. In Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts
& Co.,74 preferred shareholders claimed injury resulting from the
corporation's leveraged buy-out, as their dividend rights became subordi-
nate to the corporation's debt obligations.' The court found that because
the contract allowed for redemption of preferred stock at the option of the
corporation, the protection accompanying redemption was merely
contractual. 76 Therefore, it found no breach of fiduciary duty. The claim
was dismissed as a matter of law because the preferred shareholder's
argument was insufficient to withstand the court's strict interpretation of
the certificate of incorporation.77 Dart, like Korenvaes, illustrates how
preferred shareholders claiming injury based on preferred rights face a
tough battle in court.
In Rothschild International Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., preferred
shareholders brought suit after being "cashed-out" by the corporation
pursuant to a merger agreement. The preferred shareholders claimed both
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract.79 The Delaware Supreme
Court recognized that preference rights are contractual and governed by a
corporation's certificate of incorporation, the provisions of which are to be
strictly construed by the court."0 Under these rules, the court found that the
72 Id. at 526.
73 See id. at 527-29.
74 Dart v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., No. CIV.A. 7366, 1985 WL 21145
(Del. Ch. 1985).
75 See id. at *5.
76See id.
"See id. at *6.78 Rothschild Int'l Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984).
71 See id. at 135.
80See id. at 136.
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shareholders' claims were unfounded. First, no fiduciary duties were
implicated given that the right to receive a certain value upon liquidation
(or merger) was fixed by the contract."' Second, the contractual claim failed
the court's strict construction in that it was based on the false assumption
that the corporation was "liquidated" within the meaning of the contract.82
Finally, the court noted that where a merger is allowed by law, preferred
shareholders are charged with the knowledge that their preference rights
are subject to alteration. 3 Not only does Rothschild confirm the dilemma
faced by preferred shareholders with preferences which have been
allegedly violated, it makes the task of getting relief for these shareholders
in a post-merger situation virtually impossible.
There is some good news for preferred shareholders whose claims are
to be governed, even though strictly construed, according to the contract or
certificate of incorporation. In Winston v. Mandor,84 the court citedJedwab
and restated the general rule that if the actions complained of are in the
nature of preferred rights contemplated by the contract, they are governed
by contractual provisions, not a fiduciary duty.85 Nonetheless, the court
stated that a "corporation, like any contracting party, must interpret and
apply the applicable provisions in the certificate in good faith.186 Therefore,
if a preferred shareholder's claim is governed by the contract, the
shareholder may have some protection in the requirement that the officers
and directors must interpret and apply the contract fairly, or in good faith.
This may have been the answer that Professor Mitchell was waiting for. 7
Preferred shareholders are owed some fiduciary duties. In Eisenberg
v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp. ,88 preferred shareholders attackedthe validity
of an offer made by the corporation for its preferred stock.89 The court held
that the offer was invalid due to the breach of two fiduciary duties by the
8
' See id.
82 see id.
83 See id. at 136-37.84 Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835 (Del. Ch. 1997), appeal dismissed, 713
A.2d 932 (Del. Super. 1998).
85 See id. at 845.
86 Id. at 836.
" See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. After Winston, managers are
arguably required to interpret and apply the contract as fiduciaries, not as a party
at arms-length with the preferred shareholders. Therefore, perhaps the Jedwab rule
does in fact provide preferred shareholders with "some meaningful fiduciary
rights." Supra note 58 and accompanying text.88 Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051 (Del. Ch. 1987).
'9 See id. at 1053.
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directors. First, because the directors failed to disclose their significant
ownership interest in the corporation's common stock, the court held that
the directors breached the duty of candor owed to the preferred sharehold-
ers by failing to adequately disclose a potential conflict of interest in the
transaction. 9° The court noted that the duty of candor entitled the preferred
shareholders to disclosure of "all material facts relating to the Offer" 91.
and "an accurate, candid presentation of why the self-tender offer [was]
being made."'92 Second, the directors breached their duty of loyalty to the
preferred shareholders by issuing a threat to delist the stock if the offer was
not accepted by the preferreds.93 This threat, said the court, was impermis-
sible coercion and a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by directors to
preferred shareholders.94 Eisenberg defines the scope of fiduciary duties
owed by corporate managers to preferred shareholders as including not
only the duty of candor and the duty not to coerce,95 but also the duty to
safeguard all the other interests shared with common shareholders. 96
Preferred shareholders' right to receive dividends, a right shared with
common shareholders, was recognized as a fiduciary right in Baron v.
Allied Artists Pictures Corp.97 In Baron, the court held that preference
rights are contractual rights to be strictly construed, 98 but determined that
the right to receive cumulative dividends is nonetheless governed by a
fiduciary duty.99 Therefore, the court held that the board of directors had a
fiduciary duty "to see that the dividends were brought up to date as soon as
possible in keeping with prudent business management."'" It is important
to note, however, that Baron was decided before the court set out the
Jedwab rule. A present court might hold that the right to receive cumulative
dividends is a preference right which must be governed by contractual
principles of strict construction.
The court in Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp.10l determined that
corporate recapitalizations are transactions governed by a fiduciary duty to
90 See id. at 1057-58.
911Id. at 1056.92 Id. at 1059.
" See id. at 1062.94 See id. at 1056.
" See id.96 See id. at 1062.
97 Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
98 See id. at 657.
99 See id. at 660.
100 Id.
101 Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del. 1944).
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preferred shareholders. In Barrett, a preferred shareholder brought suit
challenging the validity ofa recapitalization plan by the corporation which
involved alteration of the rights of preferred stock.° 2 The court recognized
that a preferred shareholder in this situation has fiduciary rights, but also
has the burden of showing that there has been constructive fraud on the part
of the directors in order to support a claim alleging breach of fiduciary
duty. °3 Therefore, a preferred shareholder must demonstrate "bad faith""'
or "gross unfairness"'0" by the directors to prove a breach of fiduciary duty.
Because the preferred shareholder in Barrett did not satisfy this heavy
burden, the challenge to the validity of the recapitalization plan was
dismissed.1 6
As in Barrett, a breach of fiduciary duty was stated in terms of
constructive fraud in Security National Bank v. Peters, Writer & Chris-
tensen, Inc. 07In SecurityNationalBank, thepreferred shareholders alleged
that the directors had breached their fiduciary duty to the preferreds. The
directors refused to redeem preferred stock upon dissolution of the
corporation because redemption would have required the sale of common
stock, which the directors thought would increase in value.' 8 In other
words, the directors resolved the horizontal conflict between the commons
and the preferreds in favor of the common shareholders (as they are apt to
do because they are elected by the common shareholders),0 9 given that
only the commons gain from an appreciation in stock price while the
preferreds are merely interested in receiving their fixed dividends." 0 The
court recognized this underlying conflict and determined that the directors
committed constructive fraud by resolving the issue in favor of the
common shareholders and to the complete detriment of the preferred
shareholders."'
In effect, the directors gambled with property which should have been
used to redeem the preferred shares of PWC, and they did so without
02 See id. at 199.
103 See id. at 201.
04Id. at 205.
1051d
10 See id.
107 Security Nat'l Bank v. Peters, Writer & Christensen, Inc., 569 P.2d 875
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
10 8 See id. at 881.
,9See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
"o See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
". See Security Nat'l Bank, 569 P.2d at 881.
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informing the preferred shareholders as to their plan. By these actions, the
defendants breached the fiduciary duty they owed plaintiffs, and their
conduct constitutes constructive fraud as a matter of law.1
2
In cases of redemption, preferred shareholders may reasonably rely on
Security National Bank for the proposition that corporate managers cannot
refuse to redeem preferred shares solely to benefit common shareholders.
However, to the extent that redemption is now viewed by the courts as a
contractual right under Dart, to be governed according to the rules of strict
construction, the holding in Security NationalBankmay be of little help to
preferred shareholders.
In Dalton v. American Investment Co., the preferred shareholders
who were not cashed-out by the corporation pursuant to the acquisition
merger claimed that the corporate directors had breached their fiduciary
duty to the preferreds." 4 In response, the defendant directors argued that
the claim involved preference rights which were contractually traded away
by the preferred shareholders in return for a favorable dividend rate."5 The
directors said the rights were "a result of arms-length bargaining""H6 and
that the preferred shareholders "had nobody to blame but themselves." ' 17
In other words, the directors contended that since the preferred sharehold-
ers had opted out of their fiduciary rights in the context of a merger
acquisition, the preferred shareholders are protected solely by contractual
rights. The court, in holding that there was no breach of fiduciary duty by
the directors, based its decision not on contractual rights but on the fact that
the directors did not solicit the offer made to the corporation for the
acquisition merger."1 Therefore, it seems that to the extent directors do not
solicit offers made for the acquisition of their corporations, the resulting
alteration in the rights of preferred shares will not be attributed to the
directors. Thus, yet another obstacle was placed in the path of relief for
preferred shareholders whose rights have been impaired due to the inherent
conflict with common shareholders.
112 id.
"I Dalton v. American Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1985).
114 See id. at 575.
"s See id. at 581.
116 Id.
117 Id.
"I See id. at 582-83.
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It is important to note that the business judgment rule"9 may be im-
plicated in cases involving the conflict between the commons and the
preferreds. For instance, in Robinson v. T.LM.E.-DC, Inc., ° a preferred
shareholder challenged a corporate decision to spin-off a subsidiary
corporation.' 2 ' Although the court recognized that directors owe fiduciary
duties to preferred shareholders, it also sympathized with the impossible
position directors are placed in by being forced to make decisions in the
face of conflicting interests among shareholders. As such, the court
employed the business judgment rule in evaluating the decision.
The board of directors of T.I.M.E.-DC owed a fiduciary duty not only to
the preferred shareholders, but also to T.I.M.E.-DC's common sharehold-
ers .... These duties can sometimes conflict, and balancing them is a
difficult task. As a result, the courts will ordinarily refuse to disturb the
decisions of a board of directors, which enjoy a presumption of sound
business judgment, if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose. 22
Applying the business judgment rule, the court stated that the directors'
decision to spin-off the subsidiary did not violate their fiduciary duty to
preferred shareholders."
V. A SUMMARY OF THE METHODS
PROPOSED TO ADDRESS HORIZONTAL CONFLICT
There are several different ways to address the dilemma faced by
preferred shareholders. The method used by courts seems to be one of
compromise. The Jedwab rule provides that preferred rights are protected
only by the contract while all of the other rights that preferred shareholders
119 The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial
prerogatives of Delaware directors .... It is a presumption that in making
a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment
will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the
decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
20 Robinson v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
121 See id. at 1079.
122 Id. at 1084.
'3 See id.
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share with common shareholders are protected by fiduciary duties.'24 In
addition, preference rights governed by the contract are to be strictly
construed. 121 This rule provides little protection to a constituency which is
already disadvantaged given that it cannot vote, and is, therefore, not
highly favored by directors who are elected solely by the common
shareholders. Under the Jedwab rule, a preferred shareholder who claims
that directors have violated a preferred right faces a tough battle. The court
will look at the contract and construe it strictly according to its terms. The
problem with this rule, however, is that the contractual terms were drafted
by the issuing corporation and not negotiated between parties in equal
bargaining positions. Therefore, the Jedwab rule allows for wealth to be
expropriated from preferreds to the commons and for the horizontal
conflict between preferred shareholders and common shareholders to
almost always be resolved in favor of the commons. Furthermore, even
when a preferred shareholder is entitled to fiduciary protection by showing
unfairness associated with a right shared with common shareholders, the
preferred shareholder must overcome the presumption favoring director
action afforded by the business judgment rule. 126
For the reasons mentioned above, many commentators propose
different methods to address the preferred shareholder dilemma. Although
Contractarians argue that the contract should always control (because ofthe
positive effects of personal autonomy and bargaining by freedom of
contract), 127 this is not the solution to the horizontal conflict problem.
Under the courts' strict construction rule, the Contractarian's method
would only make the problem worse for the preferred shareholders. Instead,
because preferred shareholders are in a disadvantaged position and are
often the ones harmed by the conflict, the better methods are the ones
proposing more, not less, protection for the preferred shareholders.
As discussed above, Professor Mitchell contends that courts should
give "some meaningful fiduciary rights"''2 to preferred shareholders.
Mitchell points out the flaws in the courts' way of dealing with the
conflict. He argues that the rule of strict construction creates a paradox
in which directors, when attempting to make decisions in compliance with
the court's rules of law, are permitted to interpret the contract as a party in
an arms-length relationship with, not as fiduciaries to, preferred sharehold-
124 See supra notes 53-54, 65-67 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
's See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
128Supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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ers. 29 Therefore, contract rights drafted by the corporation and interpreted
narrowly by the courts (and therefore narrowly by directors when actions
are taken), provide little protection to preferred shareholders in situations
in which wealth is transferred to common shareholders at the expense of
the preferreds. "I Mitchell notes that"fiduciary duty trumps contract"" and
that directors should interpret the contract as fiduciaries to the preferreds.
In other words, the first question should be whether the action is fair, not
whether it is allowedby the contract.' If courts adopt Mitchell's proposal,
preferred shareholders would have some fiduciary protection when their
interests conflict with common shareholders' interests.
Professor Campbell's position is very similar to the alternative
proposed by Mitchell. Campbell argues that Pareto principles should
govern corporate transactions where at least one shareholder would be
made better off and no shareholder would be made worse off. 33 This is
substantially the same as Mitchell's argument because Pareto principles,
like fiduciary duties, require the maximization of shareholder wealth.
Therefore, under the rules proposed by Professors Campbell and Mitchell,
transactions in which wealth is expropriated from preferred shareholders
to common shareholders (with no resulting increase in corporate value) are
inherently unfair and should be protected by a fiduciary duty and not by
contractual rights drafted by and construed in favor of the corporation.
Professor Victor Brudney would go even further andpermit administra-
tive agencies to step in and enforce these fiduciary rights in favor of
preferred shareholders. In an article addressing modifications in preferred
stock, 3 Brudney noted that alterations in the terms of preferred stock
usually comply with the contractual requirements. 3 However, because of
the superior bargaining power of corporate managers and the common
shareholders, such alterations often result in unfairness to the preferreds1 36
Therefore, courts should develop standards of fairness to apply to these
attempted alterations, possibly with the assistance of administrative
agencies. 37
'
29 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
13See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 473-74.
131 Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
2 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
'34 Victor Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock
Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973).
135 See id. at 446.
136 See id. at 448.
137 See id. at 487.
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CONCLUSION
The method currently used by courts to address the horizontal conflict
between preferred shareholders and common shareholders is one which
unilaterally favors the commons and allows wealth to be transferred from
the preferreds to the commons, with no increase in corporate value. The
rule needs to be altered to give preferred shareholders some meaningful
protection and to prevent this unilateral transfer of wealth. One way of
doing this would be to require corporate directors to act as fiduciaries when
interpreting contractual terms.13 However, interpreting a contract will be
of no help to preferreds if the contract has been drafted by a corporate
issuer in terms unilaterally favorable to itself. Preferred shareholders might
therefore protect themselves by bargaining for contractual terms which will
protect their preferred rights. 39 Even this method is unrealistic, as
corporate issuers are unlikely to be willing to accept these terms.'
Another solution might be to impose some mandatory fiduciary
standards upon directors faced with a horizontal conflict. 41 Directors owe
fiduciary duties to both common shareholders and preferred shareholders
and should not be permitted to steal wealth from one constituency to
benefit the other. Doing so provides no cumulative gain to the corporation.
Therefore, courts should realize that this action violates the directors'
fiduciary duty to maximize wealth for all shareholders. Such action should
not even be upheld under the generous business judgment rule because
there is no rational basis for taking an action which does not provide a
benefit for the corporation as a whole. However, to the extent that courts
recognize the opt-out issue, fiduciary duties are unlikely to be mandated for
preferred rights which have been created by a contract agreed upon by both
parties. Furthermore, imposing a fiduciary duty on directors regarding
preference rights would be unfair to the corporation, which probably gave
preferred shareholders a favorable price, a high dividend rate, or both, in
exchange for these contractual terms.
The answer is for courts to impose new contract interpretation rules.
The strict interpretation rules presently used by courts are premised on the
view that preferred stock is the exception to the common law rule of
common stock. However, courts need to realize that preferred stock is now
13See Mitchell, supra note 2, at 449.
'
39 See id. at 476.
140 See id.
141 See Campbell, Corporate Fiduciary Principles, supra note 1, at 562-63;
Mitchell, supra note 2, at 449.
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a corporate reality deserving protection of its own. Therefore, preference
rights should not be strictly construed. Instead, courts should treat the
contract for what it is: a contract drafted by the party with superior
bargaining power (the corporation), with terms likely to be unilaterally
favorable to the corporation. Courts should thus resolve ambiguous
contractual terms against the corporate drafter and in favor of preferred
shareholders. With the imposition of this new rule, preferred shareholders
will gain some protection in cases of horizontal conflict. Further protection
for preferred shareholders may also be found in the courts' willingness to
impose good faith standards on directors in their application of preferred
rights. 1
42
Preferred shareholders are in a position of unequal bargaining power
vis-a-vis corporate managers. However, as courts level the playing field by
resolving contractual ambiguities in favor ofthe preferred shareholders and
requiring directors to apply these terms in good faith, the practice of
expropriating wealth from one group to benefit another will be eliminated.
Corporations can then focus on their job of producing profits, and corporate
managers can perform their duty ofmaximizing wealth for all shareholders,
both the commons and the preferreds.
42 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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